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Chasing a Moving Target: Exploitation and Exploration in Dynamic Environments 
 
Abstract 
A common justification for organizational change is that the circumstances in which the 
organization finds itself have changed, thereby eroding the value of utilizing existing knowledge. On the 
surface, the claim that organizations should adapt by generating new knowledge seems obvious and 
compelling. However, this standard wisdom overlooks the possibility that the reward to generating new 
knowledge may itself be eroded if change is an on-going property of the environment. This observation in 
turn suggests that environmental change is not a self-evident call for strategies of greater exploration. 
Indeed, under some conditions the appropriate response to environmental change is a renewed focus on 
exploiting existing knowledge and opportunities. We develop a computational model based on the 
canonical multi-armed bandit formulation of exploration and exploitation. We endeavor to understand the 
mechanisms by which environmental change acts to make purposeful efforts at organizational adaptation 
less (or more) valuable. 
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 1.  Introduction 
A common justification for organizational change is that the circumstances in which the 
organization finds itself have changed. This idea is broadly reflected in the contemporary literature’s 
focus on, for example, how the pace of environmental change accentuates the need for exploratory search 
(c.f., March 1991) and the importance and desirability of dynamic capabilities (c.f., Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen 1997). Claims about the value of organizational action aimed at adaptation in the face of 
environmental change have a taken-for-granted quality and, on the surface, seem obvious and compelling. 
Yet, as we will argue, change in the external environment does not necessarily imply the need for, or 
benefit of, expanded efforts at organizational adaptation. Indeed, under some conditions the appropriate 
response to environmental change is a renewed focus on exploiting existing knowledge and opportunities. 
In examining the merits of organizational adaptation, our work is closely related to March (1991), 
who identifies the need to allocate limited resources across both the exploitation of the known and 
exploration of the novel as a central strategic trade-off. If balancing exploration and exploitation is central 
to firm performance, as the consensus now suggests (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006), then what factors 
affect the appropriate balance? To answer this question, March (1991) focuses on the role of 
environmental change, reflecting a long tradition of interest in the external environment and the ability 
and willingness of organizations to adapt (c.f., Benner 2009; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Henderson 
1993; Lant and Mezias 1992; Sorenson and Stuart 2000; Tushman and Romanelli 1985). March (1991 
p.80) concludes that “exogenous environmental change makes adaptation essential,” but he then tempers 
this conclusion by noting that it also “makes learning from experience difficult.” 
The broader strategy literature is generally less circumspect. In recognizing the importance of 
Schumpeterian dynamics, the literature increasingly focuses attention on dynamic capabilities (Teece et 
al. 1997), high-velocity markets (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), and hypercompetition (D'Aveni and 
Gunther 1994). While in substance, this work is nuanced in its treatment of strategic responses to 
environmental change, in practice it is often interpreted as suggesting a simple positive relationship 
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between the extent of environmental change and the merits of organizational adaptation. This idea is 
diffused in the conventional wisdom of the practitioner literature, and managerial sentiment seems to 
reflect Peters and Waterman's (1982) call for a "bias for action." While we agree with the Schumpeterian 
focus of much recent research, our analysis suggests that an exhortation to action in dynamic 
environments is not always appropriate. As such, we endeavor to understand the mechanisms by which 
environmental change makes purposeful efforts at organizational adaptation less (or more) valuable. 
We anchor our formal development on the multi-armed bandit model. This model is the canonical 
representation of the exploration-exploitation problem across literatures as diverse as economics and 
statistics (Berry and Fristedt 1985; Gittins 1979; Robbins 1952) and computer science (Holland 1975; 
Sutton and Barto 1998). In the management literature, March (1991) originally formulated his analysis in 
terms of a specific form of a genetic algorithm;1 subsequently, he reformulated his discussion of learning 
in terms of the bandit model (Denrell and March, 2001; March 1996, 2003, 2010). 
Consider the bandit model in the context of a simple organization, where management consists of 
making choices under uncertainty. In each period, the organization must choose from a set of policy 
alternatives; it may choose to continue with the policy choice made in the prior period, or it may select a 
different policy choice. The payoff for choosing a particular alternative reflects a draw from a probability 
distribution with an unknown, alternative-specific, mean. In pursuing its activity, the organization seeks 
to maximize the flow of returns over time. The organization makes its choice in each period based on its 
beliefs about the expected returns to each of the alternatives. If these subjective beliefs were known to be 
objectively correct, then the organization would choose to exploit the alternative known to have the 
highest expected return. In the absence of such (perfect) knowledge, the organization employs a strategy 
that allocates effort between (a) exploiting the alternative currently believed to be superior, and (b) 
                                                
1 The model in March (1991) is a specific form of a genetic algorithm in the sense that individuals do not recombine attributes of 
other individuals directly, but rather they do so indirectly, mediated by the “organizational code.” 
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exploring alternatives that currently seem less promising in hope of identifying a superior alternative to 
the current preferred alternative. 
We examine this bandit model of organizational choice and focus on the implications of 
environmental turbulence that alters the returns to particular policy alternatives. Through our model, we 
highlight two main observations. First, the appropriate response to environmental change is not 
necessarily a strategic shift of effort towards exploration – indeed, a shift towards exploitation is 
sometimes superior.2 Environmental change is a two-sided “blade” with respect to the benefits of 
organizational adaptation. Scholars have tended to focus on the diminution of the firm’s current 
knowledge stock and the value of existing practices, when change renders “a prior strategic orientation ... 
no longer effective” (Tushman and Romanelli 1985 p.180). Yet there is another, less thoroughly 
considered, side of the blade. It reflects the possibility that recurring, though not necessarily predictable, 
change erodes the future benefits of additional knowledge gained via exploration, suggesting a more 
circumspect conclusion as to the merits of organizational adaptation in dynamic environments. 
Second, organizations are biased towards action in the face of environmental change, even in the 
absence of a strategic shift towards exploration. This action bias arises endogenously in the process of 
experiential learning where choices are based on beliefs about the merits of the alternatives. An 
organization exploits a particular policy alternative when it is believed to be markedly superior to others. 
Environmental change naturally undermines existing beliefs. Alternatives that were believed to be rather 
good are likely to seem worse. Moreover, there is the possibility that less examined alternatives may have 
improved. This compression of beliefs leads to an action bias in dynamic environments. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we begin by discussing the theoretical 
background of our model. Then we describe the multi-armed bandit computational model. In section 3, 
                                                
2 Keller and Rady (1999) developed a related result of a monopolist responding to a demand curve that shifts 
between two states, showing that monopolist may engage in less experimentation when the frequency of the shift 
between the two states increases.   
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we present the results of three simulation experiments. The first experiment examines the baseline 
properties of the model by focusing on a simple static environment. The second experiment adds 
turbulence to the baseline experiment. In doing so, we examine the mechanisms that underlay the action 
bias, and the appropriateness of purposeful efforts at adaptation in the face of change. The third 
experiment examines the implications of non-neutral turbulence that not only changes the relative merits 
of alternatives, but also makes the average better or worse. In section 4, we discuss the implications of 
these results for theory and practice. 
 
2.	  	  Model 
The multi-armed bandit model takes its name from a slot machine analogy. In the analogy, a 
gambler sits in front of a slot machine with N arms, each having different underlying payoff probabilities 
that are unknown to the player. The gambler’s objective is to maximize the returns to playing the 
machine. This model has been the subject of significant study because its underlying structure closely 
resembles a variety of realist economic situations ranging from research settings, such as R&D (Hardwick 
1992), to strategic issues, such as product pricing (Bergemann and Välimäki 1996), and consumer choice	  
(Gans, Knox, and Croson 2007). Common to all of these settings is that information about the returns to 
an alternative can only be gathered by selecting it. As such, the primary feature of the bandit model is the 
process of search and learning (Denrell and March 2001; March 2010). As a consequence, as Holland 
(1975) notes, in the bandit model “the trade-off between gathering more information and exploiting it 
appears in the simplest terms.” 
Formalizing the discussion above, the bandit model reflects a sequential choice problem where, at 
each point in time, t, an organization must choose between N alternatives. The realized outcome of a 
particular choice is a draw from an unknown (alternative specific) probability distribution. If the process 
is Bernoulli, then the choice of alternative i results in an outcome of σ = (1, 0) – with σ = 1 reflecting a 
positive outcome with probability pi and σ = 0 reflecting a negative outcome with probability 1-pi. As 
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such, the state of the environment can be described by the vector of payoffs to the alternatives, Pt 
=[p1,t,…, pN,t]. In the typical bandit model formulation, the environment is stable across time such that, for 
all t, Pt=P. We relax this assumption to allow for environmental turbulence.3 Consistent with the 
definition of turbulence as reflecting both the frequency and unpredictability of environmental change 
(Baum and Wally 2003; Dess and Beard 1984; Miller 1987; Wholey and Brittain 1989), we model the 
level of turbulence as the probability of a shock to the payoff values of alternatives. 
We assume that an organization is a boundedly rational actor engaged in a process of search and 
learning (Denrell and March 2001; March 2010). Choice behavior in the bandit model is driven by the 
relationship between two key organizational constructs: beliefs and strategies. We discuss each in turn 
below. 
In the bandit model, the first key feature of organizational behavior is that an organization is 
assumed to make its choice (select an alternative) based on its subjective assessment of the merits of the 
alternatives. In employing beliefs to facilitate choice, the model portrays a boundedly rational 
organization as possessing a mental model or cognitive map that encapsulates its understanding of the 
merits of the available set of choices (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff 1992; Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Nelson 
2008; Weick 1969). In particular, an organization’s belief about the merits of a given alternative is qi,t, 
indexed by alternative i at time t, such that its set of beliefs across alternatives is characterized by Qt=[q1,t 
,…, qN,t] with 0 ≤ qi,t ≤ 1.  
Two dimensions of beliefs are particularly relevant. First, subjective beliefs may (or may not) 
have objective validity. To the extent that beliefs accurately characterize the state of the world and reflect 
the true underlying value of the alternatives, then they embody knowledge of the choice opportunities that 
the organization faces. Thus, we characterize knowledge based on the sum of squared errors in beliefs 
relative to the true alternative payoffs, as 1- !! − !! !!! . Second, beliefs may embody strong or weak 
                                                
3 A static environment is typically assumed in the economics literature because of the challenges associated with obtaining closed 
form solutions. The rare exception here is Whittle’s (1988) “restless bandit” model. 
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opinions. The strength of opinions reflects the extent to which an organization believes that some 
alternatives are strongly superior to others. We characterize this as the variance across beliefs, ! −!!
!! !. 
To refine its beliefs and maximize the value of its stream of rewards, an organization engages in 
learning. In the initial period t=0, the organization has prior beliefs, Q0=[q1,0 ,…, qN,0], about the value of 
the N reward outcome probabilities P=[p1 ,…, pN]. In each subsequent period, the organization makes a 
choice from the set of alternatives. By acting – making a choice of alternative i – a firm receives feedback 
from the environment in the form of an outcome σi,t=(1, 0) associated with a reward of ri,t=(r+,r -). This 
reward may, for example, take the form of sales and profits (or lack thereof), which augments the firm’s 
stock of assets such that !! = !!!! .  
Equally important, from the learning perspective, performance feedback provides new 
information about action-outcome linkages (the value of alternatives) that serve to update beliefs. In 
particular, beliefs are updated as the organization chooses one option i and observes the outcome, σt=(1, 
0). We assume that beliefs at any given point in time reflect the average reward over an organization’s 
entire history of trials of a given alternative (March 1996, Sutton and Barto 1998). This simple average 
updating is a special case of the more general Bush-Mosteller updating methodology. In a given period, 
the firm updates its beliefs, qi,t, of the selected alternative following a Bush-Mosteller fractional 
adjustment methodology where qi,t+1= qi,t +δ(σt-qi,t) and δ is the rate of updating. Average updating is the 
special case of δ=1/(ki+1), where ki is the number of times alternative i has been tried at time t. For 
alternatives that are not selected in a given period, qi,t+1= qi,t. 
The second key feature of organizational behavior in the bandit model is that an organization is 
assumed to possess a search strategy. The organization would like to select, in each period, the alternative 
with the highest expected value, max(p1 ,…, pN). However, the expected payoffs are unknown to the 
organization. Thus, conditional on a given set of beliefs about the relative merits of the alternatives, an 
organization requires a mechanism for choosing among the alternatives. An organization’s search strategy 
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can be conceived of as a rule or routine (Cyert and March 1963; Nelson and Winter 1982) that maps the 
organization’s beliefs about the merits of alternatives to specific choices from the set of alternatives. 
Under an appropriate set of assumptions, Gittins and Jones (1974) demonstrate that an optimal 
strategy exists. The basic property of this rational choice strategy in the bandit model is as follows. 
Consider a slot machine with two arms, arm 1 has an unknown payoff probability, and arm 2 has a known 
payoff probability (or a fixed payoff). The rational choice solution involves identifying the optimal 
stopping time – the number of trials to sample arm 1 before deciding to select one or the other arm in 
perpetuity. In the context of a multi-arm bandit (with N unknown arms), the solution is not a stopping 
rule, rather it is a dynamic allocation index (Gittins index) that defines the optimal arm choice in any 
given period (Gittins 1979).  
While the optimal strategy described by the Gittins index is sufficiently computationally intensive 
such that it is intractable except under a set of restrictive assumptions (Gans et al. 2007), it is worth 
pointing out its central characteristic. The “index for an arm is equal to the expected immediate reward 
from the arm, with an upward adjustment reflecting any uncertainty about the prospects of obtaining 
rewards from the arm, and the possibilities of resolving those uncertainties by selecting that arm” (Gittins 
and Wang 1992 p.1625). The index suggests a pattern of choice over time that is sensitive to both the 
mean of beliefs, and the uncertainty surrounding that mean. 
Behavioral approaches that seek to identify an organizationally plausible, although not 
necessarily optimal, strategy date back to Schmalensee (1975) and Radner and Rothschild (1975). While 
there is a wide variety of plausible strategies, perhaps the simplest and best-known strategy is that of 
selecting, at each point in time, the alternative with the highest belief, max(q1	   ,…,	   qN), reflecting the 
highest expected reward (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002; Sutton and Barto 1998). This rule is 
referred to as greedy because at each point in time it myopically maximizes the expected reward in the 
next period. The greedy rule always exploits current knowledge, but never explores alternatives that are 
apparently inferior, but may in fact be superior. 	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As Brezzi and Lai (2002 p.105) note in their discussion of behavioral approximations to the 
Gittins index, a good rule “introduces adjustments into the myopic (greedy) rule so that some active 
experimentation is used to generate information about the unknown parameters.” Thus, a simple variation 
on the greedy rule is to behave greedily a majority of the time, but with some small probability ε select an 
alternative at random, independent of beliefs (Sutton and Barto 1998). This rule is typically referred to as 
ε-greedy. However, the ε-greedy rule has an important undesirable feature. The rule is both overly 
sensitive to beliefs and completely insensitive to beliefs. When the organization exploits (1-ε percent of 
the time), it chooses the alternative with the highest belief, even if that differential to the second highest 
belief is trivially small. In contrast, when it explores (ε percent of the time), it is equally likely to select 
among all alternatives, independent of beliefs about the merits of a particular alternative. As such, in 
exploring, the ε-greedy rule is equally likely to pick the worst alternative, as it is to pick the next-best 
alternative.	  
A well-defined and examined strategy that addresses the above deficiency is found in the softmax 
choice rule attributable to Luce (1959), and employed widely (Camerer and Ho 1999; Gans et al. 2007; 
Sutton and Barto 1998; Vermorel and Mohri 2005; Weber, Shafir, and Blais 2004). This strategy 
formulation takes the form of random choice based on a Gibbs (Boltzmann) distribution. Here, the 
probability of selecting alternative i, mi, is defined as: 
    !! =
! !!/
!
10
! !!/
!
10!
!=1
    .    (1) 
where qi is the belief regarding alternative i, and τ is a parameter reflecting the organization’s strategy.4  
A strategy, τ, maps the organization’s beliefs Q=[q1 ,…, qN] to choice probabilities M=[m1 ,…, mN] where 
!!!!!! = 1. When τ→0 even small differences in beliefs are weighted heavily. Thus, if one alternative 
                                                
4 Note that the “/10” in Equation 1 acts simply as a scaling factor. 
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is viewed even marginally more favorably than the others, it will be selected with near certainty, and thus 
we observe a very greedy strategy (highly exploitative). For example, consider a three-armed bandit with 
beliefs across arms of Q=[0.7, 0.8, 0.7].  A purely exploitive strategy would map this to a set of choice 
probabilities of M=[0.0, 1.0, 0.0] so that the firm chooses with probability one the alternative with the 
highest beliefs. In contrast, when τ→∞, differences in beliefs are shrunk to the point that the organization 
is indifferent between alternatives (even if it believes that one alternative is far superior). This leads to 
exploration as a random choice amongst all alternatives, where each alternative is chosen with probability 
1/N. Continuing the example, at very high τ, the beliefs Q=[0.7, 0.8, 0.7] would map to the choice 
probabilities M=[0.33, 0.33, 0.33]. In such a setting, the organization would be insensitive to the fact that 
its current beliefs suggest that alternative two is superior, and with probability 0.66 would choose an 
alternative other than the one currently believed best. At moderate levels of τ, alternatives that appear to 
be good (high beliefs) are more likely to be sampled. At intermediate levels of τ, alternatives that appear 
to be good (high beliefs) are more likely to be selected.5 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we wish to highlight the relationship between the bandit 
model and that of the genetic algorithm model in March (1991). We focus on two key features of strategy 
in these models (a) the mechanism governing organizational choice, and (b) the meaning of exploration. 
First, March’s (1991) genetic algorithm and the bandit model are fundamentally concerned with the trade-
off between exploitation of existing knowledge and exploring for new knowledge in the process of 
organizational learning. Nevertheless, the level of analysis is different. March (1991) generates 
differences in the balance between exploration and exploitation by altering internal characteristics of the 
organization. The strategy features of his model are tunable parameters reflecting turnover and learning 
rate at the level of the individual. In our bandit model, a strategy τ encapsulates these internal 
organizational dynamics in a single parameter reflecting the sensitivity of organizations to their beliefs. 
                                                
5 Organizations are, by design, risk neutral. They select an alternative solely based on the expected value of an alternative. Although, per March 
(1996) and Le Mens and Denrell (2011), risk aversion emerges endogenously in a model of experiential learning. 
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Yet, regardless of the level at which the tunable strategy parameter is implemented, the implications for 
tuning the explore-exploit trade-off remain consistent. 
Second, March (1991) argues that exploration not only suggests a willingness to forego the 
opportunity to engage in an action that one believes superior, but also to privilege alternatives with less 
certain beliefs. A search strategy in the bandit model implies a similar understanding of the notion of 
exploration, because choice must focus on the mean value of an alternative with “an upward adjustment 
reflecting any uncertainty” (Gittins and Wang 1992 p.1625). It is less obvious that the softmax 
formulation of strategy in our bandit model, while explicitly only incorporating the first moment of 
beliefs (qi), endogenously weights the mean belief by uncertainty. We discuss the characteristic of our 
bandit model in the analysis of the baseline characteristics of the model in the subsequent section. 
3.  Analysis 
We use the multi-armed bandit model described above as an analytical tool to engage in an 
analysis of the efficacy of alternative adaptation strategies under turbulence. The structure of the 
simulation requires initializing two sets of variables associated with: (a) the environment and turbulence 
rate; and (b) organizational strategies and beliefs. 
The opportunity structure of the environment is defined by initializing the payoff probabilities for 
each alternative. We formulate a ten-arm bandit model such that the vector of alternatives’ payoff 
probabilities is Pt = [p1,t ,…, p10,t]. The choice of a particular alternative i leads to outcome, 
positive/negative such that σi,t=(1, 0), with probabilities (pi,t, 1-pi,t) and an associated reward of ri,t =(1,-1). 
Each alternative is allocated an initial payoff probability, pi,0 that is taken to be a draw from a beta 
distribution (α=2 and β=2). This produces a distribution of payoff probabilities (across alternatives) that is 
symmetrical with mean of 0.50 and standard deviation of 0.22. The distribution resembles in shape a 
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normal distribution, but has a distribution over probability values that it is bounded between zero and 
one.6 
Models incorporating turbulence employ a probabilistic shock in a given period, where the 
probability of a shock, η, ranges from 0.0 to 0.32. When η=0, the environment is stable, and Pt=P. For 
η>0, conditional on the occurrence of a shock, the payoff to each of the alternatives is reset with 
probability 0.5. To reset an alternative, we redraw the payoff, pi,t, from the same initial beta distribution 
(α=2 and β=2). As a consequence, such turbulence is neutral in the sense that the expected value of the set 
of alternatives remains unchanged after a shock, while the payoff to individual alternatives change. 
All simulations are seeded with 25,000 organizations, each facing a unique environment with 
alternatives drawn from a beta distribution (α=2 and β=2). We set the initial asset stock to zero, and run 
the simulation for 500 periods. We specify initial beliefs across these alternatives, Q0=[q1,0 ,…, q10,0], to 
be homogenous and set the value to 0.5, which is equal to the mean value of the actual distribution of 
payoffs. The organizations are divided equally among five different strategies. The strategies, τ, reflect 
different balances between exploration and exploitation. The strategies implemented, which range from 
pure exploitation to high exploration, are τ=(0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0).7 
The analysis proceeds over three experiments in which we examine the performance implications 
of alternative strategies of balancing exploration and exploitation across different environmental contexts: 
(1) stable world, (2) turbulent world (mean neutral), and (3) turbulent world (non-neutral: mean devaluing 
or mean enhancing). 
  
                                                
6 We examined alternative initial arm distributions. In particular, we re-ran the models in this paper with arms drawn from a uniform distribution. 
The uniform is a special case of the Beta distribution with (α=1 and β=1).  The results are qualitatively the same. 
7 Equation 1 does not permit the use of a value of zero for the strategy. As τ approaches zero, the value of Equation 1 approaches infinity. 
Therefore, we set as a pure exploitation strategy the computationally feasible value of τ= 0.02. This value is sufficiently close to zero that the 
strategy reflects pure exploitation in the sense that the alternative with the highest expected payoff is chosen in all runs. As such, the figures and 
discussion in the remainder of the paper simply refer to this as τ= 0. 
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Experiment 1: Basic Properties of the Model - Adaptation Strategies in a Stable World 
We begin our analysis by examining the bandit model in a stable environment. Our objective is to 
examine the basic properties of the model and to demonstrate that it generates results that are consistent 
with the prior literature, in terms of both the March (1991) model and also the broader bandit literature. 
In Figure 1, we examine the implications of altering adaptation strategy, τ, across three measures: 
(a) exploratory choice, (b) performance, and (c) knowledge generation. Each is measured at the end of the 
simulation. First, the dashed line (right axis) represents the extent to which the choices taken by 
organizations are exploratory, measured as the probability of choosing a different alternative in period t+1 
than was chosen in period t. As τ increases, the level of exploration increases. At the most exploratory 
level of search strategy in our model, τ=1, organizations select a new alternative roughly every second 
period.8 
-------------- Insert Figure 1 about here -------------- 
Second, the solid line (left axis) represents performance measured as the accumulated asset stock. 
The graph highlights that the best strategy, which displays a moderate level of exploration (τ=0.5), 
accumulates on average 280 units, which reflects an average frequency of positive payoffs across periods 
of 78 percent. Third, the dotted line (right axis) reflects the accuracy of knowledge embodied in firms’ 
subjective beliefs about the value of alternatives at the end of the final period. We measure knowledge as 
1 minus the sum of squared error of beliefs relative to the true arm payoffs.9 The graph highlights that the 
level of knowledge obtained is increasing with the extent of exploration, from 0.55 at τ=0 to 0.72 at τ=1. 
                                                
8 We also examined alternative metrics of exploration. For example, the probability of not choosing the arm that is believed to offer the highest 
payoff. The qualitative results on exploration behavior do not change with this, or other, alternative measures. 
9 This measure of knowledge can be interpreted as reflecting an explicit comparison to the level of knowledge that would be obtained by a firm 
with beliefs chosen randomly. Knowledge is zero if beliefs are set randomly from a Beta (2,2) distribution matching reality, and knowledge is one 
if beliefs perfectly reflect reality such that SSE=0. Thus, this measure of knowledge has the attractive property that knowledge is greater than 0 
when the organization has knowledge above that of an organization with random beliefs. Organizations pursuing a search strategy that embodies 
a moderate degree of adaptiveness, τ=0.5, accumulate, on average, knowledge over the 500 periods of the simulation of 0.59. 
 
15 
Taken together, the inverse u-shaped performance curve across strategies, and the near linear 
increase in knowledge demonstrates the trade-off between generating new knowledge and leveraging 
existing knowledge. At low levels of exploration, little knowledge is attained and there is little knowledge 
to exploit. In contrast, at high levels of exploration, significant knowledge is attained, but it is never 
exploited to enhance performance. Thus, in this static environment, the results reflect March’s (1991 
p.71) conclusion that organizations that “engage in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely 
to find that they suffer the costs of experimentation without gaining many of its benefits,” while 
organizations that “engage in exploitation to the exclusion of exploration are likely to find themselves 
trapped in suboptimal stable equilibrium.” 
While our model replicates the main results of the March (1991) model, we demonstrate that that 
it also replicates key results in the bandit literature. We focus on two features of the model: (a) identifying 
the extent to which exploration in our model embodies choice based on uncertainty in beliefs, and (b) 
docking our results to a bandit model with an ε-greedy strategy. 
Gittins and Wang (1992 p.1625) note that in selecting an alternative, it is appropriate to consider 
the “expected immediate reward from the arm, with an upward adjustment reflecting any uncertainty 
about the prospects of obtaining rewards from the arm, and the possibilities of resolving those 
uncertainties by selecting that arm.” This intuition, which arises from the Gittins index, is consistent with 
the notion of exploration in March (1991) and the broader management literature. Nevertheless, while the 
softmax choice strategy we employ considers only the mean of beliefs, neglecting direct consideration of 
uncertainty, we demonstrate that it endogenously weights the level of uncertainty it its choice behavior.  
In the bandit literature, strategy is defined as greedy if, in each period, it chooses the alternative 
with the highest mean belief. Analogously, we construct a measure of greediness based on experience 
with an alternative (as a proxy for uncertainty), rather than on the first moment of beliefs. Greedy-on-
experience measures the probability that an organization will choose an alternative with which it has the 
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most experience. The results of these measures, at period 500, are presented in Figure 2. As exploration 
strategy, τ, increases, organizations become less greedy, on the basis both of mean and of uncertainty in 
beliefs. As such, organizations are more likely to explore alternatives that are presently believed to be 
inferior and for which the beliefs are relatively imprecise. 
-------------- Insert Figure 2 about here -------------- 
The intuition behind this result rests on the observation that alternatives that appear to be good are 
more likely to be sampled in the process of experiential learning (March, 1996; Denrell and March, 
2001). Moreover, the more an alternative is sampled, the more certain the estimate of its mean value. As a 
result, there is a positive correlation between the mean belief regarding the payoff to a given alternative 
and the level of experience with that alternative. When an organization chooses a low mean belief 
alternative, it is also likely to select an alternative that is known with less certainty.  Exploration strategies 
(high τ) are not only more likely to forgo alternatives with high mean belief expectations, they are likely 
to forgo more certain alternatives in favor of less certain alternatives. 
For the purposes of model docking, we rerun our simulation employing a simple ε-greedy 
strategy, rather than our softmax strategy. This enables comparisons across the two choice mechanisms. 
We expect, and observe, that as τ→0, the performance results converge to the greedy strategy with ε=0. 
Moreover, as expected from the above discussion of the characteristics of the softmax choice rule, it 
performs somewhat better than the ε-greedy choice rule. Additionally, Sutton and Barto (1998 p.41) 
examine an ε=0.1 greedy strategy on a 10-arm Gaussian (rather than Bernoulli) bandit model, and 
measure the percent optimal action. This measure reflects the probability that the alternative chosen in a 
given period is the alternative with the highest payoff probability. We examine this metric at period 500. 
In our implementation, both the τ=0 and ε=0 strategies exhibit the same optimal action result of 39 
percent. With ε=0.1, our model exhibits 63 percent optimal action, consistent with the Sutton and Barto 
(1998) result. Thus, the softmax strategy of our bandit model docks to the ε-greedy variant of the bandit, 
and our ε-greedy implementation docks to that of Sutton and Barto (1998). 
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 In sum, in a static environment, the properties of the bandit model are consistent with March’s 
(1991) claim that superior performance arises from a strategy that balances exploration and exploitation.  
 
Experiment 2: Adaptation in a Changing World 
In the second experiment, we add turbulence to the model, at levels ranging from very infrequent 
to near continuous (0 through 32 percent).10 We examine how and why turbulence alters the optimal level 
of adaptiveness embodied in a search strategy. 
 -------------- Insert Figure 3 about here -------------- 
The main results of the turbulence model are depicted in Figure 3. This figure plots the optimal 
search strategy calculated by fitting a third order polynomial to the results (that is, Figure 1 replicated 
across levels of turbulence) and extracting the strategy, τ, associated with that peak performance 
(maximum stock of accumulated assets). The zero turbulence result reflects the conclusions from 
experiment 1: peak performance occurs at a search strategy of τ=0.56, reflecting a moderate degree of 
adaptiveness. As the probabilistic frequency of turbulence increases, the optimal level of exploration 
takes an inverse u-shaped form. The curve is highly skewed in the sense that over most of the range of 
turbulence examined, the optimal degree of adaptiveness embodied in a search strategy is decreasing with 
increasing frequency of turbulence. 
In addition to altering the optimal level of exploration strategy, turbulence may also alter the 
extent of the cost associated with failing to match the optimal exploration strategy. To examine this issue, 
we calculate the flatness of the performance vs. τ curves by plotting the second derivative of performance 
at the optimal τ value (see Figure 3). If the curve is sufficiently flat, because little or no knowledge can be 
accumulated via experiential learning, then the distinction between exploration and exploitation becomes 
                                                
10 At higher levels of turbulence, performance becomes invariant to exploration strategy.  
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less relevant. Over the interesting range of turbulence (0 through 8 percent), the curve is significantly 
concave. At very low levels of turbulence (below 0.5 percent), the second derivative of performance at 
the optimal τ value is increasingly negative, implying the performance versus τ curve is increasingly 
concave at the optimal τ. This suggests that increasing turbulence enhances the rewards to choosing the 
optimal τ. As turbulence increases further (at levels above 0.5 percent), the second derivative starts to 
increase (becomes less negative), implying that the performance versus τ curve at the optimal τ is 
becoming flatter. This implies that identifying the optimal strategy becomes less important for 
performance at higher levels of turbulence.11 
Because the discussion of turbulence and exploration in March (1991) is so prominent in the 
literature, it is worthwhile to directly compare these results to his. In contrast to March (1991), the results 
in Figure 3 suggest a contingency in the relationship between turbulence and the level of exploration. 
However, March (1991) examines only a single, relatively modest level of turbulence (2 percent). His 
results, like our own, show that organizational performance is improved by increasing the level of 
exploration as turbulence increases from zero through two percent. Like March (1991), we find that under 
conditions of very infrequent environmental change, a strategy stressing adaptation via exploration and 
new knowledge accretion is optimal, but as change becomes more frequent, the optimal response is, in 
fact, one of greater inertia.  
We engage in additional analysis to understand the mechanisms driving this response to 
turbulence. First, we focus on the tension between the obsolescence of existing knowledge and the 
accretion of new knowledge. Second, we focus on the impact of turbulence on the organizations strength 
of opinions surrounding its beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives. We examine each mechanism 
in turn below. 
                                                
11 Even a flat curve performance versus τ curve does not imply that an organization should be indifferent between the levels of exploration 
strategy. In our model, exploration and exploitation have no explicit cost (only opportunity costs). If, in contrast to our model, exploration has a 
direct cost that is higher than exploitation then erring on the side of too little exploration is superior to erring on the side of too much exploration 
under high levels of turbulence. 
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Our working hypothesis, addressing the tension between knowledge obsolescence and accretion, 
is that the characterization of preferred search strategies in Figure 3 stems from the fact that turbulence 
erodes knowledge asymmetrically. That is, turbulence acts to erode performance via two knowledge 
mechanisms. First, it reduces the future value of existing knowledge because it changes the underlying 
state of the world. Second, turbulence reduces the value of efforts to generate new knowledge because the 
lifespan of returns to new knowledge is reduced in a world in which change is more frequent. We 
examine the possibility of an asymmetry in the effect of turbulence on these two mechanisms in Figures 4 
and 5.  
-------------- Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here -------------- 
We engage in a differences-in-differences analysis of knowledge levels. Holding beliefs constant 
at period 400 levels, we examine the resulting level of knowledge erosion over the subsequent 100 
periods. We then compare the period 400 knowledge results to the period 500 knowledge results 
(assuming constant beliefs), and the period 500 results assuming learning at a strategy of moderate 
adaptation, τ=0.5. The dashed line in Figure 4 reflects the level of knowledge at period 400, across levels 
of turbulence. In the absence of turbulence, the knowledge level is 0.59 (as per the analysis in experiment 
1). By the time turbulence reaches 8 percent, knowledge is reduced to 0.44. The solid line presents the 
results of using period 400 beliefs through period 500 (that is, period 400 beliefs are used, but not 
updated). As such, the difference between the solid and dashed lines reflects the erosion of existing 
knowledge over the 100-period time span. Finally, the dotted line reflects knowledge levels at period 500 
if learning (updating of beliefs) continued through to period 500. The difference between the solid and 
dotted lines reflects the improved knowledge associated with efforts at new knowledge accretion over a 
100-period time span. 
In Figure 5, the solid and dashed lines reflect, respectively: (a) existing knowledge which is 
eroded by turbulence – the difference between the dashed and solid lines in Figure 4; and (b) new 
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knowledge accretion - the difference between the solid and dotted lines in Figure 4. The dotted line in 
Figure 5 depicts the net knowledge change. 
Over the range from no turbulence through a frequency of one percent, existing knowledge is 
eroded rapidly. The more rapidly existing knowledge is eroded, other things being equal, the greater the 
impetus to explore. The alternative to employing additional efforts at exploration is using existing 
knowledge. As such, the erosion of existing knowledge defines the opportunity cost of exploring - which 
is decreasing rapidly over this range. At the same time, additional exploration is generating new 
knowledge at an increasing rate. With decreasing opportunity cost and increasing generation of new 
knowledge, there is a substantial net knowledge benefit to exploring (positive slope of the dotted line) 
and, as such, the appropriate response is one of increased exploration at low levels of turbulence.  
Over the range of turbulence from one through two percent, the existing knowledge erosion level 
is flattening and, indeed, slightly decreasing. Relative to this low turbulence range, this reflects a 
substantial decrease in the rate at which opportunity cost is decreasing. At the same time, the rate of new 
knowledge accretion is increasing. However, the increase in the rate of new knowledge accretion is 
substantially less than the decrease in the rate of existing knowledge erosion (and increase in opportunity 
cost). Thus, the appropriate response, as reflected by the negative slope of the net knowledge change 
curve, is one of decreased exploration over the one to two percent turbulence levels.  
Over the range of turbulence in excess of two percent, existing knowledge continues to erode less 
strongly (opportunity cost is increasing), and new knowledge accretion levels flatten, then decline. As a 
result, the appropriate response at higher levels of turbulence is one of further decreases in exploration. At 
the very highest levels of turbulence, there is little knowledge available to erode, and very limited 
potential for new knowledge accretion. 
In sum, the appropriate adaptation strategy depends on the effect of turbulence on both the payoff 
to utilizing current knowledge and the payoff to generating new knowledge. The value of current 
knowledge reflects the possibilities of continuing to use existing knowledge into the future and, thereby, 
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drives the opportunity costs associated with engaging in additional exploration. However, turbulence does 
not simply alter the value of existing knowledge. It also alters the payoff to efforts at gathering new 
knowledge. The effect of increasing turbulence depends crucially on the relative consequences of 
turbulence along these two dimensions. 
The second mechanism underlying the results in this experiment is that turbulence endogenously 
gives rise to an action bias, even when the exploration strategy itself is fixed. In our discussion of 
organizations’ beliefs, we have focused on the extent these subjective beliefs embody knowledge. In 
addition, there is another important dimension of beliefs – the strength of opinions. The strength of 
opinions reflects how strongly a firm believes one alternative is superior to other alternatives. We 
measure this as the variance across an organization’s beliefs. At the start of the simulation, firms have 
homogeneous beliefs about the alternatives; they simply believe all alternatives have a 50 percent payoff 
probability and, thus, the variance in beliefs across alternatives is zero. However, organizations quickly 
start to form divergent beliefs about these alternatives. 
-------------- Insert Figure 6 about here -------------- 
In Figure 6, we plot, at period 500, the accuracy of knowledge, strength of opinions, and extent of 
exploration across the range of turbulence for the τ=0.5 strategy. The dotted line highlights the 
devaluation of knowledge with increasing turbulence. The dashed line plots the strength of opinions 
(variance across beliefs). The variance in beliefs across alternatives is reduced by nearly one-third as we 
move from a stable world to one in which turbulence is set at eight percent. It appears turbulence acts not 
only to devalue knowledge, but also to homogenize beliefs. 
The reduction in the strength of opinions in the face of turbulence has important consequences for 
the nature of organizational choice. As the strength of opinions is reduced, organizations endogenously 
increase the extent to which their choices are exploratory – even holding search strategy constant. The 
mechanism driving this action bias rests on the fact that in the experiential learning process, in making 
choices, organizations are sensitive to their beliefs about the merits of the alternatives available to them. 
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Organizations exploit a given policy choice when they believe it is markedly superior to others. 
Environmental change naturally undermines existing beliefs; alternatives that were believed to be rather 
good are likely to seem worse. Moreover, there is the possibility that less examined alternatives may have 
gotten better. As the variance across alternatives in beliefs is reduced by turbulence, organizations have 
fewer bases on which to differentiate among alternatives. As a consequence of this compression in 
beliefs, organizations exhibit an action bias in dynamic environments. 
In sum, turbulence acts to alter the optimal level of adaptation by altering the returns to utilizing 
existing knowledge and generating new knowledge. Yet, as we demonstrate, turbulence does not 
necessarily give rise to a requisite shift towards a more exploratory strategy. Indeed, as the level of 
turbulence increases, the appropriate balance between exploitation and exploration shifts in the direction 
of exploitation. In addition, we noted a second mechanism at work – turbulence tends to endogenously 
generate exploratory behavior even in the absence of an overt change in adaptation strategy. In the next 
experiment, we examine further implications of this action bias. 
 
Experiment 3: Non-Neutral Turbulence 
Turbulence alters the appropriate adaptation strategy because it alters organizational knowledge. 
In the implementation of environmental change in experiment 2, turbulence reflects a shock to the payoffs 
to the alternatives, but the shock is neutral. That is, the pre-shock and post-shock distribution of payoffs 
across alternatives is drawn from the same beta distribution and, as such, the expected value of the set of 
alternatives is held constant at 0.5. In this experiment, we examine turbulence that is non-neutral in that it 
makes the world more (or less) munificent (increases or decreases the expected value of the set of 
alternatives). We hold turbulence at the level of a five percent probability of a shock and examine 
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turbulence that changes the mean payoff values (cumulatively) over the range from +/-20 percent of the 
neutral turbulence level.12 
To illustrate munificence-altering turbulence, consider the emergence of (sufficiently fast) flash 
based computer memory and the consequent changes in the digital data storage industry. This change 
reduced the payoff to producing magnetic spinning disks. It also enhanced the returns to a wide variety of 
applications that were, in the past, deemed to be inferior. These newly enhanced choices include not only 
solid-state disk drives as a direct replacement for spinning hard drives, but also alternative applications of 
long-term storage outside the realm of the traditional PC (e.g. music player, smart phone, auto). If this 
turbulence had been neutral, then to the extent that the returns to selling spinning hard-drives had been 
reduced, the expected returns to the alternatives would have been similarly enhanced. In this sense, 
neutral turbulence shuffles the deck but does not change the expected reward. Yet the turbulence in the 
long-term digital storage industry was non-neutral. The decrease in the expected returns to engaging in 
designing and selling spinning hard-drives was more than offset by the enhanced returns to the many new 
uses for solid state drives. As such, this turbulence was munificence-enhancing because it not only 
reshuffled the deck, it also increased the expected return to the set of alternatives available to 
organizations in the industry. 
Figure 7 displays the optimal search strategy across the range of the munificence of turbulence, 
holding the level of turbulence constant. Note that the zero percent point reflects the neutral turbulence 
result from experiment 2. The main result is that if turbulence increases the level of munificence, the 
optimal level of adaptiveness embodied in a search strategy increases. Because we hold the level of 
turbulence constant, the rates of erosion of existing knowledge and accretion of new knowledge is held 
fixed. As such, a different mechanism must be driving this result. 
                                                
12 We do so by shifting the parameters of the beta distribution. These shocks are cumulative in that a subsequent shock resets the 
payoff probability of an alternative from a progressively worse (better) distribution. 
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-------------- Insert Figure 7 about here -------------- 
To identify the mechanism, we plot in Figure 8 the strength of organizations’ opinions (dashed 
line) and the level of exploration (solid line) across the levels of the munificence of turbulence. With the 
search strategy held constant at τ=0.5, increasing munificence of turbulence increases the strength of 
opinions. This occurs because the payoff to all alternatives is, on average, increasing with munificence 
enhancing turbulence. However, in the process of experiential learning, organizations are more likely to 
select an alternative that is known to be good (and as such, the set of alternatives that are considered tends 
to be decreasing over time). This raises the possibility that they may fail to realize, on average, all 
alternatives have improved. Thus, in the experiential learning process, organizations may interpret the 
enhanced performance results as information about the quality of the alternative that they currently favor. 
-------------- Insert Figure 8 about here -------------- 
This increase in the strength of opinions under munificence-enhancing turbulence leads to a 
decrease in the extent of exploration (per the discussion in experiment 2). But as turbulence, neutral or 
munificence-enhancing, continues to devalue the returns to existing knowledge and to new knowledge 
accretion in the same manner, the appropriate level of τ has not changed. Thus, this endogenous decrease 
in exploration requires a countervailing change in adaptation strategy.  
In the face of munificence-enhancing turbulence, organizations are subject to an “inaction bias.” 
This bias is not driven by any inherent behavioral bias, but rather by the nature of belief formation in the 
experiential learning process.13 An increased effort at exploration (a more exploratory strategy) is needed 
to overcome the endogenous reduction in exploration that is associated with the mechanism described 
above. Indeed, the opposite is true for munificence-reducing turbulence, which tends to exaggerate the 
bias towards action. 
                                                
13 Nor is it driven by performance shortfalls relative to aspiration levels, which may also lead endogenously to exploration in the 
face of turbulence that erodes performance (Lant and Mezias 1992). 
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 In sum, this experiment serves to highlight the observation that turbulence devalues knowledge 
embodied in beliefs. This affects not only the return to an explicit strategic shift towards exploration, as 
discussed in experiment 2, but also the nature of organizational action itself. When organizations are 
engaged in learning, and they are sensitive in their choices about the beliefs regarding the relative merits 
of alternatives, turbulence can engender organizational action even in the absence of a strategic shift. 
Indeed, this experiment suggests a rather counter-intuitive conclusion. The appropriate organizational 
response to turbulence is particularly sensitive to the nature of turbulence – not only the severity, but also 
the extent to which turbulence is enhancing or degrading the state of the world.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 We examine the sensitivity of our results to (a) alternative specifications of the key parameters of 
the bandit model, (b) episodic turbulence, and (c) selection. In each case, the results are robust. First, two 
key elements of the bandit model have been altered. We examine a bandit model in which belief updating 
is implemented following a Bayesian methodology, rather than the simple average updating methodology 
employed in the discussion above. We also examine a model where the alternatives are drawn from a 
uniform distribution, rather than the near-normal Beta (α=2, β=2) distribution.14 Second, we examine a 
model in which turbulence is episodic. In particular, we examine turbulence that occurs in the middle 
third of the 500-period simulation, across a wide range of severity. We also examine turbulence that 
occurs in a 50-period window, where the window occurs earlier or later in the simulation. Third, we 
examine a model in which there is selection. We examine non-competitive selection in which an 
organization exits when its asset stock falls below zero. We also examine competitive selection, where an 
organization’s probability of failing is a function of its performance relative to other organizations. In 
each of these additional experiments, the results are robust. 
                                                
14 Note that the uniform distribution is a special case of the Beta distribution parameterized as α=1 and β=1. 
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4.  Discussion 
We formally consider the effect of changing environmental conditions on firm search strategy 
and, in particular, the extent to which an organization should pursue a strategy of adaptation under 
conditions of environmental change. On the surface, the claim that organizations should respond to 
changing circumstances by generating new knowledge seems obvious and compelling. This logic is 
reflected in a broader exhortation to action in both the academic and popular literatures – and its validity 
deserves examination. Is the exhortation to action in a dynamic environment always appropriate? Our 
modeling efforts focus attention on the implications of turbulence for organizational beliefs about the 
relative merits of alternatives, and suggest a more circumspect conclusion about the value of 
organizational adaptation.  
Our model points to an inverse u-shaped relationship between the optimal degree of adaptiveness 
embodied in a search strategy and the frequency of turbulence. This result stems from two opposing 
mechanisms. On one hand, intuition suggests environmental change devalues existing knowledge. The 
failure to respond to change in the environment implies decreased performance. This mechanism is well 
known in the existing theoretical literature and underlies much of the wisdom regarding the appropriate 
response to change. On the other hand, less well developed and understood in the literature is a 
mechanism that acts in the opposite direction. Environmental change erodes the rewards to exploratory 
efforts at accumulating new knowledge. Our analysis suggests that the delicate balance between these two 
mechanisms, and the possibility of their asymmetrical response to turbulence, determines the appropriate 
organizational response to environmental change.  
Environmental change has a second, arguably more subtle, implication. We conceive of strategies 
as reflecting managerial and organizational attempts to understand the world and act appropriately. This 
view is reflected in the bandit model where a strategy is a function that maps knowledge about the world 
onto particular choices. Thus, a search strategy does not determine a specific action, but rather, action 
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conditional on beliefs about the state of the world. For a given search strategy, belief structures that are 
more highly skewed, that place greater weight on some alternatives and lesser weight on others, will 
generate choices that are more exploitive. By implication, factors that alter organizational beliefs may 
lead to changes in choice behavior even if the search strategy is fixed and unchanging. 
When an organization is involved in a process of experiential learning, environmental change will 
tend not only to erode the extent of knowledge embodied in beliefs, but also lead to more diffuse, less 
distinct beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives. Once-attractive alternatives are likely to become 
less appealing and, as a result, once-positive beliefs about these initiatives will tend to be driven lower 
with repeated experience. By the same token, should the organization happen to explore alternatives it 
previously viewed as less attractive, it may find they have improved in the intervening periods. This 
homogenization of beliefs that arises in the experiential learning process under conditions of turbulence, 
leads to an action bias. 
Consider the case of adaptation to extreme turbulence in the auto industry. In the post-2007 
period, oil prices rose markedly and the US housing market collapsed. This led to rapid changes in 
consumer preferences; they shifted from large, heavy all-wheel drive vehicles to smaller, lighter vehicles 
with better gas mileage.  
The taken-for-granted strategy during this period of turbulence was that of significant action 
aimed at adaptation. Existing knowledge about designing and building large, heavy, and powerful 
vehicles was devalued. The response entailed altering the balance between exploitation and exploration 
by shifting resources towards the development of less well understood technologies (e.g., electric vehicles 
or light weight carbon fiber bodies) which were expected to be a better fit with the new environment. 
This strategic response is reflected in GM's effort to bring the all-electric Volt to market in the 
post 2007 period. In order to allocate resources to the Volt, GM reduced efforts to exploit existing 
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knowledge (cutting, at the margin, investment in mid-size fuel efficient vehicles).15 The process of 
developing this highly exploratory technology was very slow, not because of organizational impediments 
to change, but rather because of the limited rate of new knowledge accretion that has been an ongoing 
feature of this technology domain (batteries in particular). By the time the Volt reached the market in 
2010, oil prices had dropped to the point where the vehicle was no longer economically viable, and an 
ongoing recession made consumers highly price sensitive (as assessed by Consumer Reports, February 
2011).16 Thus, ongoing turbulence had devalued not only GM’s return to deploying existing knowledge 
and technologies (embodied in large SUVs), but also the near-term returns to their exploratory investment 
in an electric vehicle.17 
While the organizational impetus to act was strong, because this turbulence was seen as 
munificence-reducing, the returns to exploring were devalued by ongoing turbulence. Yet, there was an 
alternative course of action in the face of this environmental change. Ford, for example, chose to reduce 
its efforts at exploration, allocating a larger share of resources to exploitation. They implemented a 
strategy that focused more effort on refining existing technologies and designs, for example, deploying 
gas-electric hybrid technology in key models, and modifying the highly successful European Fiesta for 
the US market. As CNN reported in January 2009: “In the near term, the carmakers' (Ford’s) so-called 
EcoBoost engines - turbocharged engines with highly sophisticated fuel injection systems - will provide 
the greater fuel economy Americans want as gas prices rise gradually.”18 Ford did not forego exploration 
in its entirety, continuing an investment program in electric vehicle technologies, but whereas GM 
                                                
15 www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_21/b4085036665789.htm 
16 Consumer Reports, February 2011, as reported on http://green.autoblog.com/2011/03/01/consumer-reports-chevy-volt-is-
going-to-be-a-tough-sell-to-the/print/ 
17 While subsequent increases in fuel prices may render GM’s investments worthwhile, the key point is that the possibility of 
future turbulence reduces the expected returns from exploratory investment. 
18 http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/12/autos/ford_electric_plans/index.htm 
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massively shifted resources towards exploration in the face of extreme turbulence, Ford shifted resources, 
at the margin, toward exploitation. 
Our theory suggests that the appropriateness of such a strategy is a function of the extent to which 
existing knowledge is devalued by turbulence, as well as the extent to which ongoing turbulence may 
devalue investments in exploration aimed at the generation of new knowledge. The challenge for 
organizations is the ex ante assessment of the magnitudes of these two competing forces. Organizations 
should be aware of the bias to act, and view the decision to shift the exploit or explore balance towards 
exploration as a strategic choice rather than a strategic imperative. 
An interesting implication of our theory – there are conditions under which the appropriate 
response to environmental change is to heighten the degree of inertia – is broadly consistent with 
arguments within the population ecology literature that question the plasticity of organizations. But the 
mechanism in our theory is quite different. Population ecology holds that organizations are subject to 
inertial pressures that may arise from embedded organizational structures, routines, and processes that 
inhibit adaptation (Hannan and Freeman 1984). As a result, inertia may not only be a salient property of 
organizations, but that it may be performance-enhancing in the face of environmental turbulence. 
While population ecology questions the feasibility of organizational adaptation, our theory 
questions the desirability of adaptation, and points to the constraints on beliefs and their revision given 
some fixed set of experiences. This distinction between structural inertia, on one hand, and cognitive 
limitations on the rate of learning, on the other, is important because the two problems necessitate 
different solutions. If the limiting factor is structure, then the managerial implications are related to 
designing a more flexible organization, one amenable to modification commensurate with the new state of 
the world (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2009). For example, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997 p.1) argue 
for a response that “blends limited structure around responsibilities and priorities with extensive 
communication and design freedom to create improvisation within current projects.” If, in contrast, the 
limiting factor is a bound on the rate of learning, then the managerial implications are related to actions 
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that enable organizations to more rapidly acquire and effectively process new information.19 For example, 
this may take the form of building enhanced knowledge-management capabilities through additional 
efforts at environmental scanning. In technology industries, this may include corporate venture capital 
investments that provide enhanced access to information on emerging technologies (Benson and Ziedonis 
2009). Alternatively, this may take the form of purposeful organizational forgetting, selectively 
discarding old knowledge in order to foster more rapid accretion of new knowledge (Hatch and Dyer 
2004; Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck 1976). McNamara and Baden-Fuller (1999), in a case study of 
publicly traded biotechnology firms, find that newer firms may be more adaptable not only because they 
have more flexible organizational structures, but also because they learn more rapidly since prior 
(inappropriate) knowledge does not hinder the process of new knowledge accretion. 
Our multi-armed bandit model opens up the possibility of a number of potentially interesting 
extensions. Two extensions are of particular interest. First, one might model competitive interactions 
across organizations. In the model presented here, organizations are effectively competing independently 
against a common environment and subsequently comparing their performance. More realistically, 
organizations compete directly with one another. Two types of competitive interactions are promising 
additions to our model. Competition may take the form of competitive selection in which an 
organization’s probability of failing is a function of its performance relative to other organizations. 
Alternatively, competition may take the form of competitive performance feedback such that instead of 
receiving direct feedback on the success or failure of a trial, the organization receives feedback that is a 
function of its own trial success or failure, but also the extent to which others in the population were 
successful in a given period. This would make feedback about the true value of an alternative noisy, and 
in turn alter both the nature of beliefs and subsequent choices.  
 
                                                
19 Of course, there may be some relationship between interventions that address the forces of structural inertia and those that 
facilitate learning.   
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Second, one might model organizational awareness of environmental change. Organizations in 
our model are not directly aware of the existence of environmental change, and form no inferences about 
it. Yet, the usefulness of our discussion is predicated on a limited notion of awareness in the sense that an 
organization must be sufficiently aware so that it can appropriately tune its adaptation strategy. One might 
consider a more complex model in which there is second-order learning about the existence, magnitude, 
and munificence of turbulence. Clearly organizations have beliefs regarding such factors, although there 
does not seem to be strong evidence that organizations reliably forecast such matters.   
Finally, additional extensions include (a) heterogeneity across organizations in the capability to 
learn; (b) non-fixed search strategies that respond to either the stock of accumulated resources, the nature 
of existing beliefs, or the level of performance aspirations; (c) interdependence across choices; and (c) 
endogenous environmental change that derives from interdependence across organizations.  
These possible extensions provide important opportunities to build on the basic insights provided 
here, but would not negate the basic tensions characterized in the current work. Our objective is to first 
and foremost understand how knowledge is eroded by turbulence, and the consequences of this erosion 
for the appropriate level of adaptiveness. Adaptive search is multifaceted. It is not only a strategy, but also 
a set of enacted choices. Strategies map beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives to enacted choices. 
Examining the interplay between these factors greatly enhances our understanding of the dynamics of 
exploration and exploitation, and the rewards to organizational adaptation. Further, the manner in which 
these factors play out, not surprisingly, depends on the context in which they operate, in particular the 
degree environments are changing. However, the nature of these dependencies is surprising. 
Environmental change is not a self-evident call for strategies of greater exploration. The question of the 
appropriate organizational response to environmental change is a central challenge for organizations and 
unpacking and understanding this tension remains a fertile and important line of inquiry for organizational 
theorists and strategy scholars.  
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